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DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT:
AN ELECTORAL METHOD FOR RELAXED DOUBLE PROPORTIONALITY
SVANTE LINUSSON AND GUSTAV RYD
Abstract. We describe an electoral system for distributing seats in a parliament. It gives
proportionality for the political parties and close to proportionality for constituencies. The
system suggested here is a version of the system used in Sweden and other Nordic countries
with permanent seats in each constituency and adjustment seats to give proportionality on
the national level. In the national election of 2010 the current Swedish system failed to
give proportionality between parties. We examine here one possible cure for this unwanted
behavior. The main difference compared to the current Swedish system is that the number of
adjustment seats is not fixed, but rather dynamically determined to be as low as possible and
still insure proportionality between parties.
1. Introduction
The goal with the current Swedish system is to give proportionality between parties (that pass
the 4% threshold) and guarantee each constituency not too few seats, aiming at an approximate
proportionality between the 29 constituencies, see [12]. As described below in Section 2 it can
happen that the distribution of seats between the parties deviates from proportionality with
some seats for some parties. This effect has become more apparent in recent years when the
number of parties in the parliament has increased to eight and a parliamentary committee is
currently working on changes in the system.
In the present paper a slightly modified system is suggested, see Section 3, called the system
of dynamic adjustment. It guarantees the proportionality between parties and with this as a side
constraint gives reasonable proportionality between constituencies by minimizing the number of
adjustment seats. The system is based on not having a fixed number of adjustment seats, but
rather using exactly as few as is needed for that particular election. In Section 4 we describe
an efficient way to implement the principle of minimization of adjustment seats and discuss
some other practical aspects of an implementation. In Section 5.2 we scrutinize some theoretical
weaknesses of the suggested system, in Section 7 we study how it would have performed in old
elections and in Section 8 we present simulations done to test the performance.
Our main conclusion is that this would have worked well in practice in all old elections we have
looked at and would be a possible system that should be seriously considered for future elections.
One negative aspect of the suggested system is a theoretical possibility that extra votes for a
party in a constituency might not beneficial for each candidate, but the simulations in Section
8.4 suggest that it is not very likely to occur. In Section 9 we summarize our conclusions.
Note added: On January 10, 2013, a parliamentary committee appointed to suggest changes in
the Swedish election act delivered their report, [9]. The dynamic method discussed here is called
Alternativ 5, see page 69 in [9], and was by the committee considered to be the second most
preferred way to improve the Swedish system.
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2. Background
Our effort in designing the system here suggested stems from the Swedish electoral system.
All official documents in Sweden claim the electoral system to be proportional, but this need
not be the case. We have done a small, but important, change to the Swedish system in order
to guarantee proportionality between parties and still preserve a good geographic distribution of
seats.
The basis for the Swedish system is Sainte-Lague¨ method a.k.a. Webster’s method or the
method of odd numbers1. There exist equivalent formulations of this method and we will use
the version written into Swedish law which we need to describe. The seats are given to parties
(or constituencies) one at a time, in each stage giving the next seat to the party (constituency)
with the largest comparison number. The comparison number for party j is obtained as the
number of votes for j divided by 2mj + 1, where mj is the number of seats that party j has
been given previously in this process. In Sweden, for historical reasons, the system is (within
each constituency) used with the very first divisor being 1.4 instead of 1, which makes the first
seat more difficult to get for a small party. This is called the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method or
modified method of odd numbers.
We find it convenient to use a matrix formulation of the electoral system. We think of the
voting as input in the form of a matrix V = (vi,j) of actual votes, where vi,j is the number of
votes party j got in constituency i. From this we want the electoral system to produce an output
matrix M = (mi,j) where mi,j is the number of seats party j gets in constituency i. The main
ingredients in the Swedish system are as follows, for an official description with more details see
[12]. The total number of seats in the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) is 349.
(i) Before the election, 310 of the seats, called permanent seats, are distributed proportion-
ally to the 29 constituencies (based on entitled voters using Hamilton’s method a.k.a the
method of largest remainders).
(ii) When the votes have been counted, the permanent seats are distributed to parties within
each constituency, i.e. within each row separately, by the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method.
To participate in the distribution of seats a party must have reached 4% of the votes
nationwide or 12% of the votes in that particular constituency.
(iii) The next step is to do a theoretical computation of how the 349 seats would have been
distributed by Sainte-Lague¨ method considering the entire nation as one constituency.
This gives for each party j a total number of seats rj it should have, i.e. the desired
column sum of column j in M .
(iv) Each party gets extra seats among the 39 adjustment seats so that the total number
of seats for each party j equals rj . The adjustment seats are distributed within each
column with Sainte-Lague¨ method in that column, starting from the distribution given
by the permanent seats2.
BUT it could happen that some party j (or several parties) in Step (ii) received more per-
manent seats than it should have in total so the column sum exceeds rj . Then party
j gets to keep all its permanent seats. The computation in Step (iii) is then redone
1The method seems to be called Sainte-Lague¨ method in Europe and Webster’s method in the US.
2Thus, it could very well be that the final outcome in a column is not according to the Sainte-Lague¨ method
if some constituency has been given unproportionally many eats previously.
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with the votes and seats of party j removed to find how the remaining seats should be
distributed among the remaining parties. Some other party k (or several parties) will
then get its number of seats rk lowered. (It could happen that this needs to be iterated
several times.)
Example: In Table 1 is the outcome of the national election in Sweden 2010. In the top
row of each cell is the the number of votes vi,j , in the bottom row is the number of permanent
seats received to the left and the number of adjustment seats to the right (and in red). The
rightmost column shows the number of entitled voters for each constituency. We see that the
number of permanent seats for (M) and (S), second to last row 107 and 112 in step (ii) are
more than the number of total seats they should have, see last row 106 and 109 respectively.
Thus, according to the BUT, step number (iii) has to be redone which gives the new totals for
the other parties, shown to the right in the second line of second to last row. This determines
the number of adjustment seats for each party to be distributed in its column. In the second
line of the last row is the amount of disproportionality for each party. The parties in the
Swedish parliament are given by the standard ordering used in Sweden, first the four center-
right parties (that currently form a minority government): (M) Moderaterna - conservatives,
(C) Centern - agrarian/liberals, (FP) Folkpartiet - liberals, (KD) Kristdemokraterna - christian
democrats, followed by (S) Socialdemokraterna - social democrats, (V) Va¨nstern - left, former
communists, (MP) Miljo¨partiet - greens, and last the newest party in the Swedish parliament:
(SD) Sverigedemokraterna - Swedish democrats, nationalistic/anti-immigration party.
The problem of achieving double proportionality is common for many countries and has found
different practical solutions in different countries, see e.g. [10]. Several countries still have only
what we here call permanent seats, which guarantees good proportionality geographically, but can
lead to poor proportionality between parties. In other countries the distribution of seats between
parties is dominant over geographic distribution, e.g. Israel and the Netherlands. It is our
perception that in Sweden, although geographic spread of members of parliament is important,
the fairness achieved by good proportionality between parties is of highest importance. This was
also explicitly the highest priority by the committee that once formed the Swedish system in
1967, see [11].
2.1. Elections 2010. In the national Swedish election to Riksdagen in September 2010 the BUT
happened to two parties that got too many seats. Moderaterna (M) got 1 seat too many and
Socialdemokraterna (S) got 3 seats too many, see Table 1. Since the election was very close
it almost affected the majority situation in the parliament and a small fraction3 of votes, the
absentee ballots, are counted for the first time on the Wednesday three days after the election
this became very apparent and attracted large public attention. All official descriptions of the
Swedish electoral system, e.g. [12], start with saying that it is proportional, which is also clearly
the intention, the possibility of the BUT came as a surprise to many Swedes. After the current
electoral system was introduced in 1970, the BUT has happened once before in the national
elections but it was not close to influencing the power balance in the parliament so it was not
widely noticed.
In fact, by the preliminary results 2010 (without absentee ballots) the Social democrats (S)
had received 4 seats too many, but after counting absentee ballots (completed three days after
the election) they lost a permanent seat to the Greens (MP) in the constituency of Dalarna,
because (MP) in Dalarna got a higher percentage of the absentee ballots. Since (MP) got one
more permanent seat in step (ii), they were given one adjustment seat less in step (iv). If the
total proportionality of step (iii) is not changed this would normally, i.e. if the BUT had not
3 Less than 2%.
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Constituency \ Party (M) (C) (FP) (KD) (S) (V) (MP) (SD) Entitled voters
Stockholms stad 183 421 33 895 45 939 28 244 111 688 39 565 65 351 16 950 634 464
10 2 2 +1 2 6 2 3 1 29 +1
Stockholms la¨n 286 249 41 369 59 461 44 880 159 222 31 617 53 788 29 886 850 629
15 2 3 2 +1 8 2 3 2 38 +1
Uppsala la¨n 64 750 17 838 16 878 12 265 58 862 11 845 18 993 10 003 253 765
4 1 1 1 3 +1 1 +1 11 +2
So¨dermanlands la¨n 47 889 9 850 11 299 8 095 59 463 8 637 13 065 11 370 204 779
3 +1 +1 4 1 1 9 +2
O¨stergo¨tlands la¨n 80 141 17 561 19 017 16 357 92 164 14 242 21 225 14 862 330 010
4 1 1 1 5 +1 1 1 14 +1
Jo¨nko¨pings la¨n 57 901 16 859 12 134 27 822 66 316 8 775 11 438 13 888 256 538
3 1 +1 2 4 +1 1 11 +2
Kronobergs la¨n 34 762 11 559 6 667 7 111 35 555 5 380 7 044 7 424 138 781
2 1 3 6
Kalmar la¨n 41 631 13 829 7 847 9 341 55 116 7 679 8 713 8 964 184 737
3 1 +1 4 8 +1
Gotlands la¨n 9 731 5 657 1 785 1 128 12 855 2 342 3 259 1 225 46 237
1 1 2
Blekinge la¨n 27 387 5 771 5 431 3 973 36 520 5 075 5 289 9 830 118 279
2 3 +1 5 +1
Malmo¨ kommun 55 160 4 795 11 768 5 274 48 450 10 118 14 861 13 256 214 326
3 1 3 +1 1 1 9 +1
Sk˚ane la¨ns 58 628 8 164 13 967 6 989 49 900 5 847 9 869 17 448 213 580
va¨stra 4 1 3 +1 1 9 +1
Sk˚ane la¨ns 87 893 12 717 19 622 9 916 50 557 7 597 16 176 19 923 267 562
so¨dra 5 1 1 +1 3 1 1 12 +1
Sk˚ane la¨ns 60 930 12 871 12 677 9 420 54 529 6 113 10 195 21 312 232 273
norra och o¨stra 4 1 1 +1 3 +1 1 10 +2
Hallands la¨n 67 878 17 178 15 286 10 994 52 319 6 904 11 568 10 507 229 891
4 1 1 +1 3 1 +1 10 +2
Go¨teborgs kommun 96 981 12 183 26 829 19 484 80 543 27 246 34 205 15 608 389 821
5 +1 1 1 5 2 2 1 17 +1
V Go¨talands la¨n 73 853 13 563 20 194 16 525 59 477 10 506 15 794 12 504 264 666
va¨stra 4 1 1 1 3 +1 1 1 12 +1
V Go¨talands la¨n 46 582 11 449 13 393 11 092 56 060 9 907 12 003 10 513 205 328
norra 3 1 1 +1 3 +1 1 +1 9 +3
V Go¨talands la¨n 34 334 9 273 8 883 7 745 37 817 6 136 7 315 8 350 144 186
so¨dra 3 3 6
V Go¨talands la¨n 47 049 13 914 10 387 11 092 57 095 8 223 9 440 9 725 200 322
o¨stra 3 1 +1 1 4 9 +1
Va¨rmlands la¨n 45 578 13 379 10 652 8 312 68 520 10 231 9 997 8 502 213 239
3 1 +1 5 +1 +1 9 +3
O¨rebro la¨n 43 791 9 807 11 415 11 235 70 818 10 311 11 846 11 136 215 772
3 1 +1 4 +1 1 +1 9 +3
Va¨stmanlands la¨n 43 462 8 266 12 016 7 406 58 222 9 154 9 459 9 992 192 258
3 1 4 +1 +1 +1 8 +3
Dalarnas la¨n 44 997 14 086 8 747 7 925 67 139 10 533 10 652 12 470 217 072
3 1 4 +1 1 1 10 +1
Ga¨vleborgs la¨n 41 009 12 982 9 444 7 235 67 893 12 814 10 918 12 616 217 152
3 1 +1 4 1 +1 1 10 +2
Va¨sternorrlands la¨n 34 550 11 185 8 253 6 983 70 341 9 642 8 757 7 264 191 150
2 1 5 +1 8 +1
Ja¨mtlands la¨n 18 193 10 487 3 155 2 340 33 013 5 340 5 339 3 122 100 144
1 1 2 4
Va¨sterbottens la¨n 30 184 12 699 10 296 9 125 72 008 17 034 12 246 4 651 201 902
2 1 +1 +1 4 1 1 9 +2
Norrbottens la¨n 26 852 7 618 7 082 5 388 85 035 15 240 8 630 6 309 194 788
2 6 1 9
Total 1 791 766 390 804 420 524 333 696 1 827 497 334 053 437 435 339 610 7 123 651
107 21+2=23 17+7=24 11+8=19 112 9+10=19 19+6=25 14+6=20 310+39=349
Proportionality 106 23 25 20 109 20 26 20
Difference 1 -1 -1 3 -1 -1
Table 1. Outcome of Swedish national election 2010.
happened, give an extra adjustment to the party that lost a permanent seat in this case (S).
But since (S) already had too many seats the adjustment seat instead went to a third party
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Centerpartiet (C). They got this new seat in the constituency of So¨dermanland. Thus the higher
percentage of votes for (MP) caused the transfer of a seat from a coalition partner (S) to a non-
coalition partner (C). This was most likely not according to the voters’ intentions and clearly an
unwanted behavior of an electoral system.
The same principles are used also in the election to the 20 county councils in Sweden. In 2010
the BUT happened in 9 out of 20 county councils. One reason it was more likely to happen
in 2010 than previously is that the number of parties above the 4%-threshold increased to 8.
Similarly for the county councils, where there is a 3%- threshold, the number of parties has
increased to between 6 and 9.
3. Possible cures and dynamic adjustment
The deviation from proportionality might not be considered very large, but could be of large
political significance. It is also possible to improve the system to better fulfill the intention of
the law makers with rather small technical adjustments. There are at least three obvious ways
of lowering the probability of the BUT to happen:
1. Fewer constituencies4. (probably politically very difficult to achieve)
2. Changing the divisor 1.4. (around 1.2 seems to be better by some simulations5, [6, 4]) We see
no theoretical reason to think that some particular divisor would give the minimum number of
adjustment seats, but heuristically a lower divisor would make it easier for small parties to get
their first seat in a constituency and thereby lowering the probability that the big parties get
too many seats in total. But too low a divisor would on the other hand give increased risk of a
small party getting too many permanent seats.
3. More adjustment seats and fewer permanent seats.
The third possibility is perhaps the most attractive of the three above, but it has the draw-
back that to be reasonably certain to have proportionality between parties, one would need to
use a rather large number of adjustment seats. This could cause a not so good distribution of
seats between constituencies. In particular one does not want the small constituencies to be
unfavourably treated. We would like here to draw attention to a fourth possibility, which would
mean a somewhat larger change to the system by using what we call the dynamic method.
4. (Dynamic adjustment) Let the adjustment seats be exactly as many as needed to give
national proportionality between parties in that particular election6. That is, we keep the total
number of seats fixed but the point at which one switches from permanent seats to adjustment
seats is flexible.
The advantages of dynamic adjustment are several:
(i) It always gives proportionality between parties.
(ii) It is a rather small change to the current system.
(iii) It does not use more adjustment seats than necessary and thus increases the likelihood
of good geographic representation, see Section 8.
(iv) It is easy to implement, see Section 4.
(v) It avoids the strange effects in the current system as described in Section 2.
4Possibility 1 also has the drawback that it will have to be repeated separately for each county council, whereas
possibilities 2,3 and 4 easily carry over directly.
5Simulations mostly on national level to Riksdagen.
6Because of the Alabama paradox for Hamilton’s method, it would be preferable to change to Sainte-Lague¨
method also for distribution of permanent seats between constituencies, see discussion in Section 4.
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The most obvious advantage with the dynamic method compared to the current method is
that it will give proportionality between parties. It is our guess that under most circumstances
the number of adjustment seats will be relatively low, see Section 8, which would imply that no
constituency would get unreasonably few seats.
Another advantage is that we avoid the troubles that the current Swedish system runs into
when the number of adjustment seats needs to be more than 39, i.e. when the BUT occurs. For
instance, as explained at the end of Section 2, extra votes on party A might move a seat from
party B to party C in the current system. This resembles the so called population paradox of
Hamilton’s method (a.k.a. the method of largest remainders), see e.g. [2]. One reason to use the
Sainte-Lague¨ method in the first place is to avoid such things to happen. This cannot happen
with the dynamic method as the total number of seats for any party is given by a calculation on
the national level.
We have found that the negative sides of dynamic adjustment are, compared to the current
Swedish system, as follows.
(vi) It is not possible to give a theoretical upper bound to the number of adjustment seats
needed in the worst case.
(vii) It could be non-monotone for a single candidate, see Section 5.2.
(viii) The details are slightly more complicated to explain to the general public.
The lack of a theoretical upper bound on the number of adjustment seats could, at least in
a constructed example, lead to the smallest constituency (Gotland) getting only one or perhaps
even zero seats. This must clearly be avoided. Such a scenario is unlikely and in a practical
implementation one can easily add an extra requirement that the number of adjustment seats is
at most some fixed number, see Section 4. The non-monotonicity for single candidates is more
cumbersome, see discussion in Section 5.2.
A proposed system with a reminiscent dynamic adjustment was discussed in [3], but it is
rather different. For instance, there the number of permanent seats is kept fixed (one in each
constituency) and then the total size of the parliament is allowed to vary.
4. Aspects on an implementation
No matter which formulation of the Sainte-Lague¨ method is used it is easy to give a direct
description of the method of dynamic adjustment. Let us describe in some detail how this
could be done based on the formulation used in Section 2. With this formulation the seats are
distributed one at a time to the entity most deserving the next seat. Thus the outcome is not only
a total of how many seats each party (constituency) should have but also a list L in which order
they receive the seats. An outline of the dynamic method with some comments is as follows. Let
m be the total number of seats in the parliament. Note that the total number of seats is fixed.
(1) Before election the m seats are given a tentative distribution to the constituencies with
the Sainte-Lague¨ method (the odd number method). This gives an ordered list, called L
with the order in which the seats are to be given to the constituencies.
(2) Voting takes place.
(3) A proportional distribution (the Sainte-Lague¨ method) of the seats between the parties
is created. Let rj be the number of seats party j should have, i.e. the column sum of
column j in the output matrix M .7
(4) We now follow the order of the constituencies given by L. If the next seat should be
given to constituency i then an extra seat is given to row j of the matrix M . Within the
constituency (each row) the seat is distributed with the Sainte-Lague¨ method between
7In this step we assume that the Sainte-Lague¨ method is used again, but other methods are also possible. Also
other constraints such as a minimum threshold for small parties may be used in this step.
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parties. This process continues until some party j is just about to get a total of seats
larger than rj , that is the column sum of column j is about to be exceeded. Then
this part of the process ends before that seat is given out.8 We say that the stop for
permanent seats has occurred.
(5) The remaining seats are distributed as adjustment seats as in Section 2. That is to say
each column in M will get the correct column sum and the adjustment seats will be
distributed within the column using the Sainte-Lague¨ method with initial values given
by the seats already handed out in the previous step.
Remark 4.1. With this method, we guarantee proportionality between parties, since we have
made the column sums unnegotiable side constraints. The number of adjustment seats will be
exactly as small as possible, but still giving the wanted total outcome.
Remark 4.2. It is not a key point point in the method how the list L is generated in (1). The
nice feature of the Sainte-Lague¨ method here is that the length of the list does not influence the
ordering in the list, which implies that the implementation described above gives the same result
as minimizing the number of adjustment seats. This is not true for Hamilton’s method because
of the Alabama paradox, see e.g. [2, 7].
If we are afraid of the number of adjustment seats being too large, the law makers could decide
on an a minimum m′ of permanent seats. Then step (4) has to be changed to
(4’) We now follow the order of the constituencies given by L. If the next seat should be
given to constituency i then an extra seat is given to row i of the matrix M . Within
each constituency (each row) the seat is distributed by the Sainte-Lague¨ method between
parties. This process continues until some party j is just about to get a total of seats
larger than rj , that is, the column sum of column j is about to be exceeded. If already at
least m′ permanent seats have been distributed, this part of the process ends before the
seat causing the exceedance is distributed. Otherwise, this step continues until exactly
m′ permanent seats have been distributed.
Yet another possibility would be to start the process by giving every constituency 2 permanent
seats, to prevent the, unlikely, event that the smallest constituency Gotland only got one seat.
The reader might ask why after the stop for permanent seats occurs, one does not simply
remove that party and iterate (4) with the remaining parties. The reason is that the very last
seat will then be bound to go to a certain party in a certain constituency, where it might have
very few votes or even no votes at all.
5. Theoretical weaknesses of dynamic adjustment
In this section we discuss three possible drawbacks of the dynamic method from a theoretical
viewpoint.
5.1. Number of adjustment seats. One drawback with the dynamic method is that one
cannot really give any good theoretical bounds on how many adjustment seats that might be
needed. As the following example suggests the adjustment seats could in theoretically constructed
examples be very many, in fact almost all seats.
8To implement the 12%- threshold, see Section 2, one has to take some care. One could let a party A with
more than 12% of the votes in a constituency but fewer than 4% nationwide take part in the distribution of
permanent seats in this step, but not in the distribution of adjustment seats in the next step. If party A gets a
seat the total number of seats has to be reduced for the party getting the last seat in step (3), say party B. If
that party already has been given all its seats then party B gets to keep its seats and the process stops just before
party A is given any seat.
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Example 1
Assume we have two parties A and B. The total number of seats is 208. Party A gets 63000
votes and party B gets 3010. This implies that A should have 199 and B 9 seats. There are 110
constituencies and the votes are distributed as follows. We assume 100% voter turnout in these
theoretical examples.
Party A B
Constituency 1-10 300 301
Constituency 11-110 600 0
Total 63 000 3 010
Clearly Constituencies 1-10 will be first in our list L when we distribute seats. Party B will
get a seat in each of these and hence the stop for permanent seats will occur just before giving
B a tenth seat. Then the remaining 199 seats will be given to A as adjustment seats. This could
easily be generalized by increasing the number of constituencies of the second kind.
However, note in this example that the overall distribution of seats is very reasonable. Thus
the fact that the number of adjustment seats is large does not imply that we will have a poor
geographic proportionality. Also note that the main characteristic is a large number of small
constituencies where one party gets all the votes. This is far from the reality in Sweden. In Table
3 we present the number of adjustment seats that would have been needed in the elections 1970-
2010. In Figure 3 is a diagram of the number of adjustment seats needed in 10000 simulations
done around the election result of 2010.
5.2. Monotonicity for parties but not for candidates. A worse problem is the theoretical
possibility that a vote for a certain party might not be to the advantage of a candidate for the
party running in the constituency where the vote was cast.
Example 2
Consider the following situation. Two parties are competing for three seats in a total of three
constituencies. Assume first that the outcome of the election is as follows.
Constituency\ Party A B Total
I 97 98 195
II 101 100 201
III 102 101 203
Total 300 299 599
Party A should by the Sainte-Lague¨ method get two of the three seats while Party B should
get one. The list L gives one seat to each constituency in the order III, II and I. Thus Party A
will win the two seats in constituencies III and II, Party B the seat in I and no adjustment seats
would be necessary.
But if one voter in constituency I had changed his mind in the last minute and decided to
vote for Party B instead of Party A we would get the following table of votes.
Constituency\ Party A B Total
I 96 99 195
II 101 100 201
III 102 101 203
Total 299 300 599
With this outcome Party B should get two seats in total and Party A only one. The list L is
not changed so Party A gets first the seat in III and then the stop occurs and Party B gets both
its seats as adjustment seats, which will be in constituencies III and II. Thus the candidate for
Party B in constituency I lost her seat because of the extra vote she got. The candidate lost it
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to two other members of Party B, and in fact, in the dynamic method it cannot be bad for a
party to gain extra votes. But for a single candidate it could be as Example 2 shows. In Section
8.4 we test how likely this is to happen, by simulations close to the election result from 2010.
This effect is not possible in the current Swedish system.
5.3. Non-monotonicity for constituencies. A problem with the current Swedish system that,
as far as we know, has not been discussed at all is the fact that a high voter turnout in a
constituency might lead to fewer seats for that constituency. Let us for instance look at the
constituency of Halland in the 2006 national election in Sweden. The numbers of votes for the
seven parties represented are given in Table 2. Halland was unlucky and got none of the 39
adjustment seats in 2006. If (KD) had received 1337 fewer votes, they would not have received
a permanent seat in Halland. A look at the national number of votes shows that the total
number of seats to each party would not have changed and (KD) would instead have gotten an
adjustment seat in Halland.
Party actual perm. adj. assumed new new perm. new adj.
votes seats seats change votes seats seats
M 53257 3 0 0 53257 4 0
C 18589 1 0 0 18589 1 0
FP 13798 1 0 0 13798 1 0
KD 11987 1 0 -1337 10650 0 1
S 56747 4 0 0 56747 4 0
VP 7110 0 0 0 7110 0 0
MP 7236 0 0 0 7236 0 0
Table 2. If some voters in Halland had not voted in 2006 election, the con-
stituency of Halland could have received one more seat in the Swedish parlia-
ment. With the 1337 fewer votes Halland would have received 11 seats instead
of 10.
It is easy to find such examples, we could have chosen several other constituencies in the same
election. In particular the fact that the quotient 1.4 is used when determining the permanent
seats in each region but not for adjustment seats makes this rather likely to happen.
This effect relies on the fact that there are two steps in the assignment method, and would
be possible also with the dynamic adjustment method.
One subtle point of possible interest is that in the current Swedish system the number of
permanent seats to a constituency is determined by the number of entitled voters, whereas the
adjustment seats are distributed based on the number of votes given. This gives a certain mix
of relevance to these two variables. In the dynamic system this mix would not be determined
beforehand, but rather as a result of the algorithm, which might be considered unsatisfactory
from a theoretical viewpoint. The voter turnout did not vary much in last election, from 79.63%
to 86.36%.
6. Methods for measuring disproportionality
6.1. Disproportionality for parties, constituencies and voter representation. When
comparing the vote result with a seat distribution, there are three types of disproportionality to
consider: the most basic one refers to voter representation, i.e., how well the seat distribution
represents the voters. If 1% of the votes is for party A in constituency I, it would be good
if (close to) 1% of the seats were assigned to (party A, constituency I). In Swedish tradition,
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two other views have been more in focus: party error and constituency error. The constituency
error is the disproportionality when comparing the number of seats assigned to each constituency
compared with the number of votes in that constituency. An alternative definition here would
be to compare the number of seats for each constituency with the number of entitled voters in
that constituency. In this paper we will however measure the disproportionality with respect to
the actual vote result. The party error is the disproportionality when comparing the number of
seats assigned to each party compared with the number of votes for that party.
Note that much of the reported problems with disproportionality in the 2010 elections in
Sweden is due to the way that constituency error is being bounded. Among all proposed methods,
it seems that the mathematically more advanced method called the biproportional method, see
e.g [1], is best at lowering both the party error and the constituency error simultaneously. The
biproportional method could be argued for as the best method to solve the problems in Sweden.
The main reasons legislatures would prefer the dynamic method is, as far as we can see, that
they want to do only a small change to the current system and secondly that the more advanced
mathematics needed makes it less accessible to the general public in full detail.
6.2. Quantifying disproportionality. Several different methods for measuring disproportion-
ality have been suggested. We present results here in two different ways. The first way is by a
normalized l1-method suggested by Loosemore and Hanby [8]: the measure ELH of dispropor-
tionality for the seat representation s = {si} relative to the vote result v = {vi} is
ELH = 50
∑
|(vi/V )− (si/S)|, (1)
where the summation is performed over all parties or all constituencies or all pairs of (party,
constituency) depending on the error category, and where S is the sum of seats and V the sum
of votes for parties entering the parliament. The number 50 comes from the fact that they used
percentages and divided the results with 2.
Most commonly known divisor methods minimize some measure of deviation from exact pro-
portionality. One can argue, see Gallagher [5], that thus each such method comes with its
own taylored measure of disproportionality. Since the current Swedish system is based on the
Sainte-Lague¨ method, we have chosen as a second measure to use the method connected to the
Sainte-Lague¨ method, which we here will call the SL-measure. It is relative to the size of the
party (constituency) so that if a party with 5% of the votes receives 6% of the seats is considered
as larger deviation than if a party with 10% of the votes receives 11% of the seats. The formula
for the SL-measure is, with notation as above
ESL = 100
∑ 1
vi/V
((vi/V )− (si/S))2 , (2)
where again the summation is performed over all parties or all constituencies.
7. Back-testing
In this section we analyze how the dynamic method would have performed in some recent
national elections in Sweden. In particular with reference to the theoretical concerns discussed
in Section 5 on how many adjustment seats would have been needed, disproportionality and the
possibility of non-monoticity for candidates.
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7.1. Data. The vote count from the national parliament election in Sweden for the elections
{1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010} have been obtained from Valmyn-
digheten and SCB9. We were not able to retrieve the complete election data for the election of
1991.
7.2. Number of adjustment seats. In Table 3 we give how many adjustment seats the dy-
namic method would have used for the outcome of the Swedish national parliament elections.
The second row gives the number of adjustment seats needed for the modified Sainte-Lague¨
method to give proportionality. The total number of seats was changed in the early seventies.
Year 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Dynamic, 1.0 9 18 3 17 38 1 21 10 48 37 32 42 52
Dynamic, 1.4 19 17 16 26 25 12 51 10 36 36 30 30 57
Parties 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 8
Total # of seats 350 350 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349
Table 3. Number of adjustment seats needed to give proportionality for the
dynamic method, with the pure and modified Sainte-Lague¨ method respectively.
7.3. Disproportionality comparison between existing and dynamic adjustment method.
The party disproportionality between the current Swedish system and the dynamic system will
be the same every time the number of adjustment seats has been enough, i.e. the BUT has not
occurred.
From Table 4 below we see that the party disproportionality is in general small. But, as noted
in BUT, for the elections in 2010 and 1988, they are not merely rounding errors for the current
method. In agreement with the design, the dynamic method only has a party error originating
from rounding.
Year 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Current method 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.11 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.29 1.15
Dynamic method 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.24
Table 4. Measure LH of party disproportionality.
Less easy to predict is the comparison between the two methods for constituency dispro-
portionality. In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we give the disproportionality for the current method
compared to the dynamic with the LH and the SL measure respectively. The disproportionality
is not very large and as can be seen from the diagrams, the dynamic method has a slightly
smaller measure of disproportionality. We think that this is an effect of the current Swedish
method using the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method, i.e. the 1.4-factor, which gives an unwanted
disproportionality, see discussion in Section 8.
9We thank Jan Lanke that has been kind enough to supply us with the values for 1970 and 1991 in Tables 3
and 4.
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Figure 1. LH measure of constituency disproportionality. Blue stars F are
the current Swedish system and red circles with a cross ⊗ are what the dynamic
method would have given.
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Figure 2. SL measure of constituency disproportionality. Blue stars F are the
current Swedish system and red circles with a cross ⊗ are what the dynamic
method would have given.
8. Simulations
8.1. Perturbations around 2010 election results. In order to investigate both the behaviour
of the proposed method and the current method for results similar to the latest election result,
we calculate the outcome for these methods for simulated election results close the outcome of
the latest election.
The simulation is done in the following way. For party j in constituency i, the simulated
result vsij is set to
vsij = round(vij ∗ pj ∗ xij), (3)
where the pj , xij are independent stochastic variables with uniform distribution in (0.9, 1.1) and
vij is the actual number of votes in the 2010 election. Here pj is thought of as a nationwide change
for each party and xij as local fluctuations. We create N = 10000 simulated election results
according to (3), and record the number of adjustment seats, the various disproportionality
measures and check if there is a threat of non-monotonicity for a candidate, as described in
Section 5.2.
8.2. Number of adjustment seats. The numbers of adjustment seats needed in the simula-
tions are depicted in Figures 3 and 4. The average when using the standard Sainte-Lague¨ method
was 52.3 and largest 107, when using the modified Sainte-Lague¨ method the average was 49.6
and the largest 74. The standard deviation seems to be smaller when using the modified version.
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8.3. Proportionality for constituencies. The dynamic method is constructed to give a good
proportionality between parties. As the adjustment seat step is not specifically designed to
enforce constituency proportionality, we wanted to know how well the dynamic method would
do with the proportionality between constituencies, in particular when the method generates
more than the current 39 adjustment seats. For each of the simulations above we computed
the constitual disproportionality with both the LH and the SL measures. In Figures 5 and 6
we have plotted the LH and SL measures, respectively, on the y-axis and for each of the three
electoral systems separately ordered the 10 000 simulations on the x-axis by increasing measure
for comparison. As can be seen, the dynamic method did better than the current Swedish system.
One reason for this is the fact that we in the dynamic method use the standard Sainte-Lague¨
method, i.e. without the modifying 1.4 factor, see the discussion at the end of this section. For
comparisons sake we have also done a version of the dynamic method with the modifying 1.4
factor, even though we do not suggest this as a method to be used in practice. As can be seen,
that does increase the constituency disproportionality. The main conclusion is that the difference
in disproportionality for constituencies is not very large between the methods when simulating
around the 2010 election result. From the perturbation results, we see that the behaviour is
very much the same for the simulated election results as for the actual 2010 voting result; in
the sense that the dynamic method performs well but the current method fails to deliver party
proportionally.
The disproportionality for the current Swedish system is thus on average larger than for the
dynamic system. In SL-measures the dynamic system had however the worst 7% cases which
should be investigated further. With the LH-measure the dynamic method clearly outperforms
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Figure 3. Histogram over the number of adjustment seats needed for pro-
portionality in 10000 simulations of the dynamic method with the standard
Sainte-Lague¨ method. Average 52.3, maximum 107.
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Figure 4. Histogram over the number of adjustment seats needed for propor-
tionality in 10000 simulations of the dynamic method with the modified Sainte-
Lague¨ method. Average 49.6, maximum 74.
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Figure 5. LH measure: The dynamic method (red, average 3.61, maximum
5.72) performed better than the current Swedish method (blue, average 4.23,
maximum 5.62 according to the LH measure for disproportionality between con-
stituencies. Included in green is for comparison the dynamic method using the
modified Sainte-Lague¨ method.
Figure 6. SL measure: In the best 93% of its performances, the dynamic
method (red, average 0.89, maximum 2.21) performed better than the current
Swedish method (blue, average 0.99, maximum 1.67 according to the SL measure
for disproportionality between constituencies, but in its worst 7% it did worse.
Included in green is for comparison the dynamic method using the modified
Sainte-Lague¨ method.
the current Swedish system when it comes to proportionality between constituencies, even though
the largest three values (of 10 000) of the LH measure come from the dynamic method.
There is a reason why the current Swedish system does not behave so well for constituency
proportionality. Consider a constituency A where some party is very close to getting a permanent
seat, but does not get it because of the 1.4 factor. When the adjustment seats are distributed
within that party, the constituency A will then be very competitive since it has so many votes
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that it actually should (if the standard Sainte-Lague¨ method had been used) have gotten a
permanent seat there. This non- symmetry, that the 1.4 factor is used for permanent seats
but not for adjustment seats, we believe to be the reason why we get on average improved
proportionality also for constituencies with the dynamic method. By looking at data from old
elections, it seems that the current system is somewhat favoring medium sized constituencies.
We have not done any statistical tests to verify this.
8.4. Probability of non-monotonicity for candidates. In Section 5.2 we discussed the pos-
sibility of non-monotonicity for a single candidate with the dynamic method. In order to estimate
the likelihood of this we checked in the simulations if this could happen.
We considered the following scenario. Let A be the party that got the last overall seat in
step (3), see Section 4, and B (different from A) the party that is closest to gaining one seat,
i.e. has the highest comparison number after the last seat. If A received all its seats in step
(4), i.e. before the stop of permanent seats occurred then if A lost that last seat to B the stop
for permanent seats would happen earlier. If B got any permanent seat in between the last two
permanent seats for A we let K be the constituency in which B got this seat (could be several
options in which case we took the last). We ran 10 000 simulations as above and we got 595
triples A,B,K to investigate further.
For each such triple, we need to add votes to B so that B gets one more seat in total from A.
The votes to B could be distributed in many ways among the constituencies, which influences
how likely B is to get an adjustment seat in K. We did two different approaches. First, we
added all the votes in constituency K. In 352 of these cases B lost a permanent seat in K. The
reason they did not always lose a permanent seat is that the extra votes can cause B to get the
permanent seat earlier in L. In 332 of the 352 cases B got an extra adjustment seat in K instead.
Thus, in 20 of the 10 000 simulations did in fact the candidate for party B in K lose the seat
with this approach.
Secondly we tried to add the votes to B more proportionally among the constituencies. To be
more precise, we added votes distributed as Bs previous votes and then one extra in constituency
K. In this setting, the candidate for party B in K lost the seat in 43 of the 10 000 simulations.
From both of these experiments we conclude that the non-monotonicity for a candidate is not
completely esoteric. For election results similar to the latest Swedish results, it is sometimes
possible with rather small addition of votes to create the non-monotonicity. When looking at the
random addition of votes in one party and constituency, the non-monotonicity is very unlikely.
First, several conditions must be fulfilled as for A,B,K above and second the party B must gain
just the right amount of extra votes, properly distributed.
9. Conclusions
Our main conclusion of this study is that the dynamic method is an interesting alternative
that should be seriously considered when Sweden wants to change the current system. It would
have worked well in previous Swedish national elections and simulations around the outcome of
the national election of 2010 also shows it would work well. It would in most cases not only
give a better proportionality between parties, but also give a better proportionality between the
constituencies. This is mainly due to the fact that we discard of the modifying 1.4-factor in the
Sainte-Lague¨ method.
We have not been able to find any large drawbacks with the method. The largest is the
theoretical possibility of non-monotonicity for a given candidate for a party, as explained in
Section 5.2 and the fact that the dynamic method would be slightly more complicated than
the current method to explain to the general public. If desired as a safeguard against a too
unfair distribution among constituencies, a practical implementation of the dynamic method
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could easily be using a lower bound on the number of permanent seats, either in total or for each
constituency.
The simulations in Section 8 around the national election result of 2010 show that it was not
an unlucky accident that the current Swedish system gave non-proportionality for parties. It
does so in 95% of the simulations, see Figure 4. One conclusion is that if Sweden does not want
this to happen again, the system should be changed in one way or the other.
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